Auditing standards requiring auditors to issue going concern opinions (GCOs) have existed for several decades. The FASB exposure draft of June 2013 suggests early disclosures of uncertainties about an entity's ability to continue as going concerns (GCUs). The FASB's board argues that the proposed amendments would improve the timeliness and the quality of disclosures of going concern opinions. In Israel, since 2008, about 70% of the publicly traded companies implemented the two-phase models for going concern auditors' opinions. We utilize a hand-collected dataset of 143 GCOs of publicly traded companies for the years 2007-2013. We examine the stockholders' and bondholders' asymmetric market reactions to GCOs preceded by early warnings of uncertainty (GCUs) compared to companies where the GCO disclosure tracks a "clean" opinion. The findings indicate that the equity and debt market reacts to GCUs in a negative and economically significant fashion. In addition, we find that GCUs reduce the negative market reaction to GCOs. This finding indicates that GCU announcements improve the timing and quality of the financial statement disclosure.
I. Introduction
Since the financial crisis in [2007] [2008] , the accounting discipline has reformed dramatically. In order to improve financial statement disclosure standards, the going concern opinion (GCO) became the focus of discussion of the relevant regulators. Just recently, after countless discussions and suggestions for changes, the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) concerning the GCO have stabilized. For example, in August 2014, the American FASB already published an update regarding going concern conventions (the FASB's first draft of the issue was published in October 2008).
The going concern assumption is the core of the accounting discipline. If this convention is compromised, the usual accounting principles lose meaning and must change to suit the situation of an entity that is about to cease to exist as a going concern. Accordingly, the two sets of standards disciplines -the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and the generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) -engage extensively with the issue in an attempt to create standardization, which is the essence of the accounting discipline. Naïve questions are asked in order to understand why there must be duplication when two separate regulatory systems, which are written by regulatory bodies, differ, discuss and establish separate standards regarding the going concern assumption. It is important to understand that while corporate management is committed solely to the provisions of GAAP, the auditor must examine the proper existence of those provisions that make the accounting rules, but this is through the application of generally accepted auditing rules (GAAS).
Recently in the US, the FASB published an update of the accounting standard ASU 2014-15 (August 2014). The process began in October 2008, and included several rounds of public comments and drafts. In fact, from the time the standard update will be enforced in late 2016 (although firms may have voluntarily adopted the standard earlier), the GAAP in all Western countries will lay the responsibility for evaluating the entity's ability to continue as a going concern on the shoulders of management and not on the external auditor. Essentially, the updating accounting standard issued by the FASB, is similar to international accounting standard IAS 1 and the new Israeli standard 34, which came into force at the beginning of 2014. All of these standards specify a set of requirements for the management of a company to deal with substantial doubt about the existence of the going concern assumption. Actually, even after the amendment's implementation we can still find differences between the American, International and Israeli GAAP (mainly for the required examination period, where the American and Israeli standards are satisfied with 12 months, while the International Standards consider 12 months to be the minimum test period), but most of the parameters regarding this issue were created uniformly.
Thus, we learn that the GAAP in the western markets, following the financial crisis, determine that a firm's management should be responsible for evaluating the entity's ability to continue as a going concern in the process of preparing the financial statements. Management's responsibility is reflected in cases where the executives believe that there are significant doubts about the appropriateness of the going concern assumption, therefore the management will attach a detailed explanation regarding the financial statements that disclose in detail what the main factors are behind the significant doubts about the appropriateness of the going concern assumption. Last year, both the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), and the American counterpart (FASB), published guidelines that are supposed to create uniformity regarding the circumstances that should bring a corporation's management to determine that there is significant doubt about the appropriateness of the going concern assumption. In fact, according to the accounting standard's update in the US (ASU 2014-15) , the main role of management responsibility is to anchor the issue and reduce the differences in content and timing of the note that management must include in the financial statements. It should be noted that the US Financial Accounting Standard Update (ASU 2014-15) was supposed to bring further reforms that were rejected and were ruled out after public comments. Two major reforms were canceled: the obligation to extend the period examined from 12 months to 24 months from the date of the financial statements, and the proposal to add a GCU before significant doubt about the appropriateness of the going concern assumption was not created. Ultimately, after public comments, the last reform, which proposed early warning disclosure in a period of uncertainties, was not approved by the FASB. Since the concept of the early warning disclosure reform was implemented in the Israeli capital market starting in 2009, we examine this issue thoroughly in our paper.
After discussing the GAAP-related going concern assumption, we must relate to the generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) of the western capital market in order to complete the overall picture. Israeli audit standard number 58, which was implemented in 1994 (long before the financial crisis of 2008), is analogous and almost identical in content to the US standard, SAS 126. The standard states that the auditor should consider the risk of the validity of the going concern assumption by examining warning signs that come to his attention from the financial statements or other sources. In such cases, the auditor's duty is to consider whether the warning signs point to considerable doubt as to the existence of a going concern assumption. If the auditor comes to the conclusion that the going concern assumption is not appropriate in light of the doubts that emerged on the issue, he should ensure that the management provide disclosure in the financial statements, and he also needs to draw attention in his opinion (the auditor's report), to that note given by the management. The international auditing standard issue ISA 570 is very similar to the major demands expected of the auditor on this subject.
In this section, we shall discuss the GAAS that are the key to understanding the two-stage model implemented in Israel, and thus provide the missing piece of the puzzle of the auditing standard relating to the issue of the going concern assumption. The Israeli auditing standard no.
72 is similar to the American standard SAS 122, which requires the auditor to direct the financial statement user's attention, through an "emphasis of matter paragraph" that stating the auditor's opinion and refers the reader to the notes or data written by management in the financial statements, which he finds necessary to emphasize. The American standard requires diverting attention to the following specific situations, which are shown as examples in the Standard: (1) an expectation of significant regulatory change; (2) when a significant catastrophe exists or is expected, which will affect the entity's financial position; (3) significant transactions with affiliates; (4) significant and unusual events after the balance sheet date. In contrast, the Israeli standard does not provide a list of examples, and specifies two types of situations in which we divert attention when the resulting uncertainty may have a significant impact on the financial statements: (1) a going concern qualification in accordance with the provisions of Standard 58, which is discussed further in this paper; (2) uncertainty which constitutes a matter whose results depend on future actions or events that are not directly under the entity's control.
Thus, we see that the Israeli standard grades two types of emphasis of matter paragraphs in the auditor's report concerning uncertainty. The more severe one will receive a GCO according to a predefined wording in line with accounting standard no. 58. The wording of the less severe type is not predefined and is subject to auditor's judgment in line with accounting standard 72.
1 The 2008 financial crisis brought back the focus of regulators and financial markets to the importance of the timing of such auditor's notices. Many companies had their auditors settle for the softer notice according to accounting standard 72, drafting their opinion as a vague and non-decisive text. Consequently, the Israeli SEC has issued specific instructions highlighting the differences between the two types of notice and the correct reasoning for choosing one over the other.
Nowadays, based on several Israeli SEC announcements on this subject, the best practice applied to most public companies is a two-stage notice for uncertainties related to going concern assumption. According to this practice, the auditor will first apply a notice according to accounting principal no. 72, describing the financial or operational uncertainty as well as the management's proposed solutions (hereinafter GCU). At a second stage, and only if the business activity continues to deteriorate, the auditor will apply a notice based on accounting standard No.
(hereinafter GCO)
. The Israeli SEC supports this two-stage model for application by public companies.
The two-stage model applied in Israel provides a solution for the post-financial crisis era, with the aim of informing financial markets in due time, allowing investors to make informed decisions regarding potential debt restructuring or liquidation, as applicable. This being said, it has not been proved that such a model increases the chances of recovery for a business that is subject to operational or financial difficulties. In fact, there is ongoing debate as to whether disclosing the business difficulties in due time outweighs the obvious risk that the same disclosure of negative information about the company's performance will actually push the company towards an irreversible state, forcing investors to acknowledge equity losses.
Our research is innovative in two respects. First, we examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the two-stage model that includes early disclosures of uncertainties about an entity's ability to continue as a going concern (GCU) before providing a going concern opinion (GCO). Second, we examine the immediate market reaction of bondholders, those stakeholders who are the primary losers if the company ceases operations, to the GCO in general, and to the two-stage model in particular. To our understanding, testing the immediate bond market reaction is essential to complete the puzzle of the timing and quality of the two-stage model. Use of the two-stage model is a conventional practice of the publicly traded companies' managements in Israel and their auditors, and is encouraged by the Israeli SEC. The generally accepted auditing standard in the US enables the auditor to draw attention to material matters, and thus, the model can be implemented in the US as well without any change of regulation.
In the following sections, we will first present an explanation in section II of the statutory requirement of management disclosure in Israel in addition to the two-stage model. In section III we review relevant literature that focuses on the going concern opinion (GCO) and the bondholders market reaction to accounting information. The hypotheses and methodology are described in section IV; the empirical results are described in section V; and section VI concludes our paper.
II. Statutory disclosure requirement for publicly traded companies that suffer from financial instability
In this section, we describe different phases of disclosure of the Israeli financial statement system that are used as warning signs. The two-stage model is in the auditor's opinion, and the other are solely the management's responsibility. We decided to describe all the warnings that influence the stakeholders, including those that come from the management to convey all the information that can be relevant for publicly traded companies suffering from financial uncertainty. Figure 1 below depicts the phases that are warning signs for the various stakeholders in the company's financial statements, reflected in the financial reporting package, on both the quarterly financial statements and the annual financial statements. We define "Warnings" as those that are found in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A). We define "PCF" as the projected cash flow for the next two years that is mandatory and will be shown in the MD&A in cases where the warnings include signs of liquidity problems. We define "GCU" as early disclosures of uncertainties about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern, and "GCO" as a going concern opinion.
The first issue that should awaken a warning light in the heart of readers of the statements is the determination by the company's board of directors in the MD&A that in spite of warning signs in the company's financial statements, there is no liquidity problem and therefore a decision to refrain from publishing a projected cash flow statement (PCF). This situation will occur, in accordance with the new directives of the Israel Securities Authority, if and when there is a deficit in working capital but inspections conducted by the board of directors show that there is no liquidity problem. In this situation, although the board of directors is not required to publish a projected cash flow statement (PCF), it must provide public disclosure of its inspections and findings. This being the case, the user of the financial statements can and should view the determination of the board of directors as a disturbing warning sign. Although there is no liquidity problem in the business, financial warning signs have arisen for the first time.
The second phase is a statutory duty by virtue of Regulation 10(b)(14) of the Securities Regulations (Periodic and Immediate Reports), 1970. To the best of our knowledge, Israel is the only country in the world that requires companies undergoing difficulties to publish, as part of the board of directors' report, forward looking information in the form of a projected cash flow statement (PCF). As set forth in the regulation, a projected cash flow statement for two years ahead is to be added when there are one or more of the following warning signs (in consolidation or alone): a shareholder deficit; a deficit in working capital or in 12 months' working capital and also an ongoing negative cash flow from operating activities; an emphasis of matter paragraph of the auditor relating to the financial condition of the corporation (GCU); an emphasis of matter paragraph of the auditor regarding significant doubts about the corporation's ability to continue as a going concern (GCO); a deficit in working capital or in 12 months' working capital, or an ongoing negative cash flow from operating activities, if the board of directors has not determined that this is not an indication of a liquidity problem in the corporation.
This being the case, the disclosure required in Israel when there are significant warning signs in the financial statements is exceptional. We cannot trivialize the regulation's requirement for the company's Board of Directors to give positive and active confirmation that the expected financial resources of the corporation will suffice to cover the future uses over the next two years. The Board of Directors is responsible for examining the reasonability of the scope and the timing of the resources and uses reported in the projected cash flow statement, which is structured according to the guidelines of the cash flow statement, appearing as part of the company's financial statement, i.e., with a division into cash flow from operating activities, from financing activities and from investment activities.
This requirement for the Board of Directors, which relates to all the conceivable warning signs (including some of the subsequent phases of the process that we will review, GCU and GCO), as stated, does not exist as a binding regulation in other countries. For example, in the United States, a projected cash flow statement is a voluntary statement. Wasley and Wu (2006) showed that companies that decide to add a projected cash flow statement are companies that believe that the report will improve the investors' reactions in the case of a higher than expected loss and will lend credibility to a higher than expected profit. Moreover, it seems that the use of a projected cash flow statement is more common in the American market among young companies that wish to project credibility. In England, in October 2013, the FRC published a directive that stresses the importance of voluntary publication of a projected cash flow statement for public companies undergoing financial difficulties and for those that will want to raise additional debt from investors.
In this case, we have seen that the two first phases are obligatory disclosure under the responsibility of the company's Board of Directors, which is unique to the Israeli economy. The third phase that should signal and constitute a warning sign to users of the financial statements is an emphasis of matter paragraph that the auditor adds with regard to financial uncertainty that afflicts the corporation (GCU). As can be seen according to the conditions that we described, a GCU and GCO in the auditor's opinion will necessitate a PCF, but not every projected cash flow will necessitate a deviation from the uniform version of the auditor's opinion. Since the findings that we gathered illustrate that a PCF precedes the GCU by three quarters on average, there is no doubt that this stage is distinguished from the others and should be addressed.
In accordance with our findings, the third phase -GCU, in which the accountant adds to his opinion an emphasis of matter paragraph as to financial uncertainty, is also a phenomenon unique to Israel. As stated above, in accordance with auditing standard 72, an emphasis of matter paragraph is provided in situations where there is significant uncertainty with respect to the condition of the corporation. The accepted practice in Israel since the financial crisis, with active encouragement of the Securities Authority, has led to the fact that on average, based on empirical data that we have gathered, a GCU appears four quarters before the addition of a GCO by the auditor. It is important to note that in the United States the possibility of adding the aforementioned stage to the financial reporting arrangement has recently been examined by the FASB, but the proposal was rejected. Although in the United States the going concern notices come too late by all accounts, the fear of adopting the preliminary stage, which stems from the risk that the company will be drawn into distress prematurely, led to the idea being rejected. It should be noted that numerous studies illustrate that a going concern notice in itself could lead to a survival problem for the company, so that there is substance to the decision of the professional entities in the United States (Carson et al., 2013) .
Those with discerning eyes surely took note of an intriguing empirical finding. As stated, on average three quarters elapse between PCF and GCU, and four quarters between GCU and GCO. This means that on an average, between the initial publication of the cash flow statement and the addition of a going concern notice to the financial statements, less than two years elapse, only seven quarters. The significance of this figure is that within the period of time of the twoyear projected cash flow statement, the company's condition deteriorates and its accountants add an emphasis of matter paragraph as to financial uncertainty, and subsequently a going concern notice, which we will present below as the fourth phase.
In the fourth phase, the accountant adds to his opinion an emphasis of matter paragraph with respect to significant concerns with regard to the appropriateness of the going concern convention (GCO). The same "going concern notice", in market parlance, is defined in Israeli auditing standard 58 and similarly also in the United States under U.S. auditing standard SAS 126 -as notice that is added by the auditor, according to his judgment, by way of an emphasis of matter paragraph, when there are significant doubts with regard to the continued existence of the audited entity as a going concern. In March 2012, the Israel Securities Authority published an auditing enforcement decision regarding the going concern notice (AU-12-01), whereby in certain cases the inspection should be extended for a period exceeding one year. The decision precedentially establishes that the duration of the inspection is a function of the company's financial condition and is not necessarily limited to one year. This directive is relevant to what we have said thus far, since if the company publishes a two-year projected cash flow statement (PCF), it is reasonable to assume that it can predict a significant deterioration that requires the addition of a going concern notice even if it involves an event that is expected to occur more than an entire year later.
The fifth and last phase that is relevant to the matter at hand is liquidation, stay of proceedings or debt restructuring. Not all companies that have reached the fourth phase and published financial statements with a going concern notice will reach this stage, but the probability is fairly high. The fifth phase is also reflected in the financial reporting package, either by way of modification and adaptation of the auditor's opinion or by way of a note in the financial statements. It should be noted that the company can in many cases continue to exist even subsequent to the fifth phase. Here the economic aspect is already reflected, where by attaching valuations, the companies may prove solvency despite the financial difficulties afflicting them. As stated, the aim of the above article is to explain the accounting aspect, and from the fifth phase on the jurists and the appraisers take the stage, whereas the auditors have no more tools in their arsenals. In line with this, we will now advance to the third chapter, in which a review of the literature relevant to this paper will be presented, while delving into the two core subjects of the article: the going concern convention and the various effects of adding the going concern notice to the financial statements; and the reactions of stakeholders who are not equity holders of the company, but are only bondholders, to the publication of accounting information.
III. Literature Review
The accounting field focusing on GCOs attached to financial statements developed in the beginning of the 1980s. Kida's (1980) research for example, based on a survey of auditors, teaches that merely referring to the GCO in financial statements might bring a company to financial distress. This may happen even though the company never had any actual problems prior to the publication of the financial statements. Carson (2013) survived. This data shows that there is a high probability that a GCO will indeed lead to a survival problem. These studies, in addition to papers such as Vanstraelen's (2003) , demonstrate one of the known claims about GCOs, that it has a golem effect because of its self-fulfilling prophecy.
Several researchers have examined the market's reaction to GCOs in the past. For example, Chen and Church (1996) tested the relationship between the market's reaction to the attachment of GCOs to financial statements and to the declaration of bankruptcy that arrived later. In the framework of the research, they tested whether the publication of a GCO before the declaration of bankruptcy reduces the market reaction because of publicly declaring bankruptcy.
The researchers found that a GCO does indeed provide useful information to the companies' investors and creditors. The research concluded that a GCO reduces the surprise and conferment that exists in the market at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy. It was found that at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy, there is a difference in the rate of the excess return between companies that received a GCO and those that didn't receive a GCO prior to bankruptcy. In the incidents where a GCO was published prior to the declaration of bankruptcy, the rate of negative change in the price of corporate bonds was lower at the time of the declaration than when no GCO was published. As stated, the explanation for this difference is that investors saw the GCO that was published in the past as relevant to them, and therefore the information regarding bankruptcy was not new to them and its publication caused only a moderate negative market reaction. Similarly, Holder-Webb & Wilkins (2000) found that the market reaction at the time of a company's bankruptcy declaration is more moderate for companies that received a GCO from an auditing accountant than for companies that didn't receive a GCO prior to declaring bankruptcy. On the contrary, studies such as Al-Thuneibat et al., 2008 , Dodd et al., 1984 Elliote, 1982; Herbohn et al., 2007; Ogneva, 2007 ; which tested the market reaction to GCOs, found that there is a non-significant market reaction or none at all to GCO announcements. Menon and Williams (2010) tested the contradictory results in the existing literature by means of processing a large number of GCOs for the first time in a short period of time. They found that the market reaction to a GCO is more negative when the company reports financial problems, and even more so when there is a violation of covenants. In addition, the researchers found that the more the institutional investors' holdings grow, the more negative the market reaction, and their holdings decrease immediately after the appearance of a GCO.
As can be seen, the relevant research in the literature thus far focused on the influence of GCOs on the stock market. We will add to the existing literature with an innovative test of the two-phase model customary in Israel, and will examine it thoroughly in relation to the stock market and to the bond market, which is unique in Israel as it is an active market with daily returns. Before that, we will now turn to a short literature review about the reactions of stakeholders who are not shareholders, but only bondholders, to the publication of financial data.
This follows the first part of the literature review focusing on the first core subject of this paperthe influence of publishing GCUs and GCOs in financial statements. (2014), we learn that the significance of financial data in the bondholders' view has not decreased over the years. On the contrary, the researchers explain that examining the bondholders' reactions is indeed important, however it has yet to be examined due to lack of daily commerce data with an emphasis on bond value and daily trade volume in those bonds. Our intention is to fill this gap thanks to the uniqueness of the Israeli corporate bond market, which is traded unprecedentedly in the main stock exchange, in comparison to the western world, and not over the counter (OTC).
Our research tests specific components in company financial statements -the GCU and the GCO. These components include negative information and therefore should affect bondholders more than positive information. A recently published research by Chen et al. (2014) deals with this aspect of the influence of GCOs on bondholders and bond contracts, but focuses on private bonds and not public bonds. Their findings show that GCOs are relevant and valuable as they increase the cost of debt.
Additional researchers that test the connection between bonds yields, accounting data and financial data are Rosen and Zhou (2012), and Hotchkis and Rosen (2002). They find that the content of the information in the financial statements on the day the statements are published is reflected quickly in the bond prices, and that the standard of efficiency in implementing the information for the corporate bond market is no less than as for the stock market. Furthermore, Rosen and Zhou (2012) indicate that the reaction of the bond market to new information about significant trading by institutional holders is quicker, upon publication of surprising financial statements, in comparison to series traded among private investors.
Other studies describe the bond market's reaction to a variety of macroeconomic news.
Those studies create a distinction between the types of bonds and the extent of the reaction to the new information. The findings show that there is variance in the reaction of corporate bonds to publications in accordance with bond characteristics, such as average duration, rating level (investment or speculative rating), and the yield-to-maturity rate (Huang & Kong, 2005 , Kosturov & Stock, 2010 .
IV. Methodology and Hypothesis
Our research is empirical and based on data collected manually about Israeli public companies traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange in the years 2009-2013. These are companies that issue stocks and/or bonds (see Table 1 ). We use the Maya TASE website, which publishes all relevant public announcements and prices of publicly traded stocks and bonds. We describe and explain our hypotheses below, one by one, and the methodology we used to test these hypotheses.
H1a: Stock and bondholders react negatively and significantly to early disclosures of uncertainties about an entity's ability to continue as a going concern (GCU).

H1b: Stock and bondholders react negatively and significantly to disclosures of going concern opinions about an entity's ability to continue as a going concern (GCO).
We divided the first hypothesis into two parts, in order to test the two-stage model implemented in Israel. We assume that the stock and bond market is efficient and that the market reacts negatively to announcements with a negative impact on all the stakeholders. Our unique dataset includes daily bond prices and thus enables the testing of the bondholders' immediate reactions to uncertainties about the companies. Testing and understanding the debtholders' reactions in an active market and not over the counter (OTC) is very important, since bondholders become significant victims in situation of financial distress. We also test whether and how stockholders and bondholders respond to the early warnings. We assume that the immediate market reaction should be negative for all stakeholders.
The methodology that we use for the first hypothesis and as a basic tool for the subsequent hypotheses is the market model. We examine abnormal returns (AR) in a window of 28 days (-22, +5) while the period of estimation is 200 days before the announcement. For calculating returns, we look at the daily closing prices of stocks and bonds. We use the Tel-Aviv 100 index (TA-100, the index of the hundred largest stock companies traded on the TASE) as the stock market portfolio; we define Rm as the return on the TA-100 for calculating abnormal stock returns, and the Tel Bond 60 Index for calculating abnormal returns on the relevant bonds. We examine the statistical significance of our empirical findings by using a one-tailed t-test. Below is the equation we used to examine the excess return:
ARi,t = Ri,t -(αi + βi Rm,t)
ARi,t = Abnormal return for firm i at time t Ri,t = Return for firm i at time t
H2: Auditors' opinions that include emphasis of matter paragraphs as to financial uncertainty (GCU) are a significant indication of a corporation's instability and thus lead to opinions that include going concern qualifications (GCO).
The objective of the second hypothesis is to examine the probability that the financial uncertainties about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern, the GCU, would later lead to significant doubt about the going concern assumption, the GCO. In fact, this hypothesis tests the practice of implementing the two-phase model. Since there is no clear link between auditors'
opinions that include emphasis of matter paragraphs as to financial uncertainty and opinions of a going concern qualification, then this is not a model of two integral stages. On the other hand, if the relationship is perfect, then you can say with 100% complete probability that the first step leads the second step; this is not actually a two-stage model but one stage that extends over a specific time period, no more.
The methodology we chose to examine the second hypothesis is logistic regression. We test how a GCU affects the chances of receiving a GCO. We add a control variable of the industry for each firm. We divided the companies into six industries: high-tech, investment and finance, oil and gas exploration, real estate, services, and commerce. Below is the logistic regression equation: INDUSTRY-six industries: high-tech, investment and finance, oil and gas exploration, real estate, services, and commerce.
H3: Early disclosures of uncertainties about an entity's ability to continue as a going
concern, GCU, moderate the stock and bond market reaction to going concern opinions, GCO.
The third hypothesis is that the GCU gives relevant information and thus serves as reliable and timely information for investors. Accordingly, we believe that the shareholders and bondholders will react moderately to a GCO when previously warned by GCU, in comparison to a GCO that surfaced without preliminary audit information.
We use linear regression for testing the third hypothesis. We test the influence of GCU cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on the GCO CAR. We add the above control variables:
projected cash flow (PCF), warnings on the MD&A (WARNINGS), auditor firm and industry.
Below is the linear regression equation that we use:
CAR(GCO)= α + β 1 CAR(GCU) + β 2 PCF + β 3 WARNINGS + β 5 AUDITOR + β 6 INDUSTRY + ε
Dependent Variable -CAR (GCO) cumulative abnormal return (-22, +5) for a going concern opinion.
Explanatory variable -CAR (GCU) cumulative abnormal return (-22,+5) for uncertainty of a going concern.
Control Variables:
PCF -projected cash flow that management attached to the MD&A.
WARNINGS -warnings of management on the MD&A.
AUDITOR -identity of the auditing firm.
INDUSTRY -six industries: high-tech, investment and finance, oil and gas exploration, real estate, services, and commerce.
V.
Results
We began with a sample of all the public (stock and/or bond) companies in Israel traded in the years 2008-2013 on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE). We also collected the prices of all the relevant stock and bonds.
[Insert Table 1] As concluded from Table No both to the economic situation that adversely affected businesses and to the regulatory changes that were introduced in Israel as lessons learned from the financial crisis.
[Insert Table 2] As stated, one of the reasons for delisting companies is encountering financial difficulties resulting from the financial crisis that has been sweeping the world in recent years. Indeed, as can be concluded from Table No . 2, in 2008-2013 a GCU or GCO appeared in the financial statements of roughly one fifth to one quarter of the corporations traded on the stock exchange in Israel (the two-stage model practiced in Israel). It is interesting to discover that while the number of companies to which the auditors attached a going concern notice was on the rise during those years, the number of companies to which a GCU added was actually on the decline. This finding can be viewed as confirmation of the assumption that there is an accepted practice in Israel of a two-stage model in the auditor's work in this regard. Thus, companies to whose statements GCU (first stage) had been added previously, have already "progressed" and published in the subsequent years a GCO (second stage). In line with this, it can theoretically be argued that the height of the crisis is behind us, as fewer and fewer companies enter the first stage, which, as we will see further on, leads with fairly high probability to the second stage, which is a very worrisome indication for all the stakeholders of the company -a going concern notice. With respect to every reporting company in Israel, we examined whether and when it published forward looking information in the board of directors' report in the form of a projected cash flow (PCF) statement for two years ahead pursuant to the statutory requirement that was presented in the previous chapters as the second phase in the process of a company entering financial difficulties. Furthermore, we located the first auditor's report with respect to each reporting company that contained a GCU (third phase above), as well as the first date when the auditor attached a GCO (fourth phase) to the company's statements. Table No . 3 shows the period in quarters between phases two, three and four.
[Insert Table 3] As can be concluded from Table No . 3, on average three quarters elapse between the initial publication of a PCF and the publication of a GCU, and four quarters between the initial publication of a GCU and the initial publication of a GCO. This illustrates that while the cash flow statement is supposed to constitute a forward looking statement by the company's board of directors, as during the period of the next two years a cash flow problem is not anticipated, in fact, within only seven quarters the financial condition of the company deteriorates to the extent that its accountants add a going concern notice to its financial statements.
[Insert Table 4] Table no. 4 empirically verifies our first hypothesis, whereby the holders of the share capital and the bondholders react significantly negatively to the publication of a GCU and to the publication of a GCO. It can be concluded from the table that the excess return in a time window of 28 days (+5, -22) is indeed significantly negative statistically. It is interesting to see that the reaction is negative in approximately the same degree to both parts of the two-stage model. The holders of the share capital reacted -10.59% and -9.31% to the publication of a GCU and to the addition of a GCO respectively; whereas the bondholders reacted -5.46% and -5.50%
respectively. It can be understood from these empirical findings that a GCU constitutes an important signal and a serious warning sign in the eyes of the investors, both the equity holders and the debt holders. Furthermore, it can be seen that the intensity of the shareholders' reaction is stronger than that of the debt holders. We can cling to the crediting order in a limited company as an explanation for this phenomenon, since the shareholders are last and therefore they have more to lose in a bankruptcy situation than the bondholders.
[Insert Table 5] As part of our attempt to deepen the examination of the shareholders' and bondholders' reactions to the regulation reflected in the reporting package of public companies in times of financial instability, we chose to also examine the identity of the auditor who added a GCO to the financial statements of public companies in Israel during the years 2008-2013. As can be concluded from Table No . 5, the Big Four firms were responsible for the publication of only 14.67% of the going concern notices during this period if we take into consideration their average market share in Israel during those years. In other words, the rest of the firms, which are not members of the four largest firms in the world, were the ones that audited most of the companies (85.33%) for which going concern notices were added. Two different and perhaps opposite conclusions can be drawn from this in our opinion. The first, that the major firms have stricter quality control so that companies with a higher potential for financial instability are not audited by them in the first place. The second, that the auditors of the major firms are less reluctant to add going concern notices for the companies they audited, even when the economy is in a slowdown that stems from a worldwide economic crisis.
[Insert Table 6] In accordance with the logistic regressive output data shown in Table No . 6 above, it can be determined that our second hypothesis was correct and indeed the publication of a GCU constitutes a significant indication of the corporation's instability and therefore clearly leads to the publication of a GCO. It can be concluded from the table that this does indeed involve a twostage model, as on the one hand, not in every industry in the economy does the publication of a GCU lead with high probability and clearly to the addition of a GCO by the auditor to the financial statements; whereas on the other hand, we conclude that there clearly is an unequivocal empirical relationship between both stages so that they are indeed dependent on one another.
[Insert Table 7] Our third hypothesis, whereby the shareholders and the bondholders react significantly more moderately to a GCO in cases when it was received after the publication of a GCU, compared to situations in which GCU had not been published, was tested while distinguishing between the excessive reaction of the holders of the share capital and the excessive reaction of the bondholders. In Table No . 7 the linear regressive output data is shown, which indicates the intensity of the excessive reaction of the holders of the share capital to receiving a GCO given a number of different parameters. This includes previous publication of a GCU, previous publication of a PCF, previous publication of warning signs at the company, the identity of the auditor, and the industry with which the company is affiliated. As can be seen from the table, the only variable found to have a significant effect on the reaction of the shareholders is the company's affiliation with the service sector.
[Insert Table 8] In Table No . 8 the linear regressive output is shown. It indicates the intensity of the excessive reaction of the bondholders to receiving a GCO given a number of different parameters which includes previous publication of a GCU, previous publication of a PCF, previous publication of warning signs at the company, the identity of the auditor and the industry with which the company is affiliated. We conclude from the table that the third hypothesis is valid with respect to the stakeholders of the company who are not the holders of the share capital, but the bondholders. The table illustrates that with very high significance, the previous publication of a GCU affects the intensity of the bondholders' reaction to the addition of a GCO to the financial statements of the company by its auditor. As can be seen, among all the variables that we tested, only the publication of a GCU affects the reaction of the debt holders of the company. In our opinion this demonstrates that the investors consider the first stage of the two-stage model to be a meaningful signal that provides relevant, reliable and effective timely information from their point of view.
VI. Conclusions
In this study, we examine the two-stage model of the auditor's opinion on the financial statements for companies with financial stress, using the unique laboratory that is the Israeli market. We also refer to management responsibility in cases of distress; the Israel Securities Authority (ISA) imposes warnings and requires a projected cash flow in such cases. We examine three hypotheses: First, the holders of the share capital and the bondholders react clearly negatively to the publication of a GCU and the publication of a GCO. Second, that the publication of GCU is a significant indication of a corporation's instability and thus clearly leads to publication of a GCO. Third, that the holders of the share capital and the bondholders react significantly more moderately to a GCO in cases when it was received after the publication of GCU compared to situations in which GCU had not been published.
Our findings are based on data collected manually about public companies in Israel which own share capital and/or negotiable bonds, and show that GCUs and GCOs jointly and separately constitute very significant signals for company stakeholders, both shareholders and bondholders , who find such information to be relevant and reliable indications that a public company is in a situation of financial instability that could end in liquidation, receivership, debt settlement or bankruptcy.
We have seen that the two-stage model that is common practice in Israel, encouraged by the Israel Securities Authority and relying on generally accepted auditing standards, is an important regulatory tool for investors in the capital market in particular and stakeholders in general. These are two distinct phases that are indeed likely to come one after the other, but they do not bind each other. They enable the company's management, its board of directors and its auditors to shed light, for the users of financial statements, on the financial instability afflicting the company, which is highly likely, but not certain, to damage the going concern assumption. VII. Tables and Diagrams   Table 1 Number of publicly traded companies in Israel in the years 2008-2013
The data was manually collected from the Maya TASE website, and show the total number of companies traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) that issued stock and/or debt for each year from 2008 to 2013. We also documented the number of IPOs and delistings for each of those years. Table 2 Timeline of the two-stage model: going concern uncertainty (GCU) and going concern opinion (GCO) in Israel in the years 2008-2013
Delistings
The data was manually collected from the Maya TASE website, and show the total number of companies traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) issuing stock and/or debt that published financial statements including earlywarning uncertainty opinions (GCU) and going concern opinions (GCO) for the years 2008-2013. Table 3 The gap between the first projected cash flow (PCF), the first early warning uncertainty opinion (GCU) and the first going concern opinion (GCO)
The data was manually collected from the Maya TASE website. We show the time elapsed (in quarters) between the initial publication of a projected cash flow (PCF) in the MD&A and the first GCU, and then between the first GCU and the first GCO. Table 4 Market reaction to GCU and GCO The data from the financial reports of the publicly traded Israeli companies that issued stock and/or debt was manually collected from the Maya TASE website. The data show the number of early-warning uncertainty opinions (GCU) and going concern opinions (GCU) in the years 2008-2013. We also collected prices of the relevant stocks and bonds. We examine abnormal returns (AR) in a window of 28 days (-22, +5) . The period of estimation is 200 days before the announcement; for calculating returns, we look at the daily closing prices of stocks and bonds. We use the Tel-Aviv 100 index (TA-100, the index of the hundred largest stock companies traded on the TASE) as the stock market portfolio; we define Rm as the return on the TA-100 for calculating abnormal stock returns, and the Tel Bond 60 Index for calculating abnormal returns on the relevant bonds. We examine the statistical significance of our empirical findings by using a one-tailed t-test. *, **, *** indicate significance at the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
No
Bond market reaction Stock market reaction GCO GCU GCO GCU -5.50*** -5.46*** -9.31*** -10.59*** CAR (-22 Table 6 Logistic regression -probability of company to receive GCO after GCU The data was manually collected from the Maya TASE website. We use logistic regression to test how a GCU affects the chances of receiving a GCO. We add a control variable of the industry for each firm. We divided the companies into five industries: high-tech, investment and finance, oil and gas, services, and commerce. Table 7 Linear regression -Stockholders' excess return to going concern opinion (GCO)
PR>
The data was manually collected from the Maya TASE website. The linear regression equation that we use is as follows: Control Variables:
GCU -uncertainties about an entity's ability to continue as a going concern PCF -projected cash flow that management attached to the MD&A WARNINGS -warnings of management on the MD&A AUDITOR -identity of the auditing firm.
INDUSTRY -high-tech, investment and finance, oil and gas, real estate, services, and commerce. Table 8 Linear regression -bondholders' excess return to going concern opinion (GCO)
PR>|T|
The data was collected manually from the Maya TASE website. The linear regression equation that we use is as follows: Control Variables:
INDUSTRY -high-tech, investment and finance, oil and gas exploration, real estate, services, and commerce. Without qualifying our opinion, we draw attention to Note X in the financial statements. The company has incurred losses amounting to $Y in the year ended December 31 ABCD and has a working capital deficit of $X on that date. These factors, together with other factors detailed in the above note, raise substantial doubt about the Company's ability to continue as going concern. "The management plans regarding these matters are described in Note X. The financial statements do not include any adjustments to the values of assets and liabilities and their classification, which may be necessary If the company will not be able to continue operate as a going concern.
GCO
Example from a financial report published in 2013:
Without qualifying our opinion, we draw attention to the fact that in XX (month) 2014 our company is scheduled to repay debt of Y million US dollars.
Repayment will be made from the Company's available cash balances, cash arising from the repayment of loans to the company from certain investee companies, from the realization of certain assets, and from raising cash against a pledge of available assets pledged or raising capital. The successful realization of the company plans is not a certainty, because it is not under its complete control. However, management believes that the company can repay its obligations as they come due in the foreseeable future.
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